Sample Works in Progress
Let's Talk about Trade: Trade Policy Characteristics and Political Elites' Domestic Discussions of Trade
(with Timothy Taylor)
The attention international trade receives at the domestic level varies widely across countries as well as among political elites within the same country. When and why are political elites likely to dedicate attention to this issue, and what type of rhetoric are they likely to use when they do so? We argue that political elites are more likely to focus domestic attention on international trade when their states' economies are more dependent upon trade. The balance of trade influences the way the those discussions are likely to be framed, and the complexity of their country's trade policies affects the degree to which political elites are enabled or constrained in their ability to engage in these differently framed discussions. We test this argument by analyzing how political elites referenced issues related to international trade in their party platforms in the lead-up to national elections across fifty-three countries from 1960 to 2014. The results show that these characteristics of countries' trade policies are related in important ways to political elites' strategic choice regarding when and how to focus domestic attention on international trade.
Bargaining Strategies and the Failure of Civil War Peace Agreements
(with Amy Skoll)
In the civil war literature, there is substantial research on why states intervene in intrastate conflicts as well as on how external intervention impacts civil war outcomes. However, these previous works fail to take into account the connection between the two: how the motivations behind why states intervene in the first place can influence how that intervention subsequently affects the civil war outcome. We argue that there are cultural, economic, geostrategic, and ideological reasons why external states intervene in intrastate conflicts and that these reasons shape the type of intervention states pursue: “hard” military intervention in the form of troops and weapons, “soft” military intervention in the form of funding, intelligence, training, etc., economic sanctions, or increases in foreign aid. Taking the variables that trigger these motivations into account, we expect these different types of interventions to influence the outcome of civil wars in different ways. Using a multi-stage model, we demonstrate how the strategic choice to pursue each type of intervention affects the way those interventions influence the likelihood of a civil war ending in a negotiated settlement.
Bargaining Strategies and the Failure of Civil War Peace Agreements
(with Katharine Floros)
Why do so many civil war peace negotiations end in failure? We argue that peace agreements are a function of parties’ bargaining power - the most important source of which is the relative value of parties’ best alternative to agreement (BATNA). One of the goals of parties’ negotiating strategies is therefore to improve the relative value of their own alternative to agreement by worsening that of their opponent. In a civil war context, this alternative to agreement is defined by the continuation of the war. Thus, if one of the two parties believe that continuing to fight can worsen the relative position of the other party, they are likely to reject a peace deal and continue to fight. Rejection of peace agreements and the continuation of civil war can thus be explained as an attempt by one side to win a better distribution of the benefits in the next round of negotiations through changes in the parties’ relative bargaining power expected to occur during the intervening period while war continues. To test our argument, we introduce a new dataset of civil war negotiations that captures the process of negotiations more completely than previous models. Among other key factors, these data code when negotiations are proposed, at what point failed negotiations break down, and whether signed agreements are successful in ending the fighting.
Issue Linkage, Bargaining Power, and Concessions in Trade Negotiations
To understand international negotiations it is important to understand when and why states are likely to give and receive concessions. Understanding this concession-offering process allows us to understand why the outcome of the negotiation looks the way it does – i.e., whose interests are represented in the outcome, and why. I argue that two factors affect when states are likely to win concessions and on what issues those concessions are likely to be received: (1) the degree to which states value the overall set of issues on the table differently, and (2) their bargaining power on each of those individual issues. When the issues being negotiated are more differently valued by the bargaining states, a trade of concessions is more likely to occur. Each side is therefore more likely to receive concessions when the issues on the table are more differently valued. But on what issues are they likely to win those concessions? Counterintuitively, I argue that states are likely to win concessions on precisely the issues on which they most need an agreement, and thus have the least bargaining power. It is therefore the interaction of having more differently-valued issues on the bargaining agenda and less bargaining power that leads a state to win concessions on a particular issue at stake in a negotiation. I test this argument by examining an original dataset of states’ bargaining power and concessions received in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The results show that states are likely to win concessions on an issue when the full set of issues on the table are more differently valued and it has little bargaining power on that particular issue – results that have important implications for our understanding of power and outcomes in international negotiations.
(with Timothy Taylor)
The attention international trade receives at the domestic level varies widely across countries as well as among political elites within the same country. When and why are political elites likely to dedicate attention to this issue, and what type of rhetoric are they likely to use when they do so? We argue that political elites are more likely to focus domestic attention on international trade when their states' economies are more dependent upon trade. The balance of trade influences the way the those discussions are likely to be framed, and the complexity of their country's trade policies affects the degree to which political elites are enabled or constrained in their ability to engage in these differently framed discussions. We test this argument by analyzing how political elites referenced issues related to international trade in their party platforms in the lead-up to national elections across fifty-three countries from 1960 to 2014. The results show that these characteristics of countries' trade policies are related in important ways to political elites' strategic choice regarding when and how to focus domestic attention on international trade.
Bargaining Strategies and the Failure of Civil War Peace Agreements
(with Amy Skoll)
In the civil war literature, there is substantial research on why states intervene in intrastate conflicts as well as on how external intervention impacts civil war outcomes. However, these previous works fail to take into account the connection between the two: how the motivations behind why states intervene in the first place can influence how that intervention subsequently affects the civil war outcome. We argue that there are cultural, economic, geostrategic, and ideological reasons why external states intervene in intrastate conflicts and that these reasons shape the type of intervention states pursue: “hard” military intervention in the form of troops and weapons, “soft” military intervention in the form of funding, intelligence, training, etc., economic sanctions, or increases in foreign aid. Taking the variables that trigger these motivations into account, we expect these different types of interventions to influence the outcome of civil wars in different ways. Using a multi-stage model, we demonstrate how the strategic choice to pursue each type of intervention affects the way those interventions influence the likelihood of a civil war ending in a negotiated settlement.
Bargaining Strategies and the Failure of Civil War Peace Agreements
(with Katharine Floros)
Why do so many civil war peace negotiations end in failure? We argue that peace agreements are a function of parties’ bargaining power - the most important source of which is the relative value of parties’ best alternative to agreement (BATNA). One of the goals of parties’ negotiating strategies is therefore to improve the relative value of their own alternative to agreement by worsening that of their opponent. In a civil war context, this alternative to agreement is defined by the continuation of the war. Thus, if one of the two parties believe that continuing to fight can worsen the relative position of the other party, they are likely to reject a peace deal and continue to fight. Rejection of peace agreements and the continuation of civil war can thus be explained as an attempt by one side to win a better distribution of the benefits in the next round of negotiations through changes in the parties’ relative bargaining power expected to occur during the intervening period while war continues. To test our argument, we introduce a new dataset of civil war negotiations that captures the process of negotiations more completely than previous models. Among other key factors, these data code when negotiations are proposed, at what point failed negotiations break down, and whether signed agreements are successful in ending the fighting.
Issue Linkage, Bargaining Power, and Concessions in Trade Negotiations
To understand international negotiations it is important to understand when and why states are likely to give and receive concessions. Understanding this concession-offering process allows us to understand why the outcome of the negotiation looks the way it does – i.e., whose interests are represented in the outcome, and why. I argue that two factors affect when states are likely to win concessions and on what issues those concessions are likely to be received: (1) the degree to which states value the overall set of issues on the table differently, and (2) their bargaining power on each of those individual issues. When the issues being negotiated are more differently valued by the bargaining states, a trade of concessions is more likely to occur. Each side is therefore more likely to receive concessions when the issues on the table are more differently valued. But on what issues are they likely to win those concessions? Counterintuitively, I argue that states are likely to win concessions on precisely the issues on which they most need an agreement, and thus have the least bargaining power. It is therefore the interaction of having more differently-valued issues on the bargaining agenda and less bargaining power that leads a state to win concessions on a particular issue at stake in a negotiation. I test this argument by examining an original dataset of states’ bargaining power and concessions received in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The results show that states are likely to win concessions on an issue when the full set of issues on the table are more differently valued and it has little bargaining power on that particular issue – results that have important implications for our understanding of power and outcomes in international negotiations.