Sample Works in Progress
Bargaining Strategies and the Failure of Civil War Peace Agreements
(with Katharine Floros)
Why do so many civil war peace negotiations end in failure? We argue that peace agreements are a function of parties’ bargaining power - the most important source of which is the relative value of parties’ best alternative to agreement (BATNA). One of the goals of parties’ negotiating strategies is therefore to improve the relative value of their own alternative to agreement by worsening that of their opponent. In a civil war context, this alternative to agreement is defined by the continuation of the war. Thus, if one of the two parties believe that continuing to fight can worsen the relative position of the other party, they are likely to reject a peace deal and continue to fight. Rejection of peace agreements and the continuation of civil war can thus be explained as an attempt by one side to win a better distribution of the benefits in the next round of negotiations through changes in the parties’ relative bargaining power expected to occur during the intervening period while war continues. To test our argument, we introduce a new dataset of civil war negotiations that captures the process of negotiations more completely than previous models. Among other key factors, these data code when negotiations are proposed, at what point failed negotiations break down, and whether signed agreements are successful in ending the fighting.
Issue Linkage, Bargaining Power, and Concessions in Trade Negotiations
To understand international negotiations it is important to understand when and why states are likely to give and receive concessions. Understanding this concession-offering process allows us to understand why the outcome of the negotiation looks the way it does – i.e., whose interests are represented in the outcome, and why. I argue that two factors affect when states are likely to win concessions and on what issues those concessions are likely to be received: (1) the degree to which states value the overall set of issues on the table differently, and (2) their bargaining power on each of those individual issues. When the issues being negotiated are more differently valued by the bargaining states, a trade of concessions is more likely to occur. Each side is therefore more likely to receive concessions when the issues on the table are more differently valued. But on what issues are they likely to win those concessions? Counterintuitively, I argue that states are likely to win concessions on precisely the issues on which they most need an agreement, and thus have the least bargaining power. It is therefore the interaction of having more differently-valued issues on the bargaining agenda and less bargaining power that leads a state to win concessions on a particular issue at stake in a negotiation. I test this argument by examining an original dataset of states’ bargaining power and concessions received in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The results show that states are likely to win concessions on an issue when the full set of issues on the table are more differently valued and it has little bargaining power on that particular issue – results that have important implications for our understanding of power and outcomes in international negotiations.
Let’s Talk About Trade: The Politicization and Framing of International Trade Policy
(with Timothy Taylor)
When, why, and how will political elites focus on issues related to international trade in national elections? We argue that political elites are more likely to discuss international trade, in general, when the economic size of the trade agreements that define their state’s trade policies are greater, and they are more likely to frame those discussions of trade in ways that suit their own political interests when those agreements are more complex. We test this argument with cross-country data, focusing on characteristics of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) agreements a state has joined and all preferential trade agreements (PTAs) to which a state is a party. Our empirical results show that the characteristics of a state’s trade policies do likely influence the discussions of international trade put forth by political elites in their party election platforms in important ways.
Reserved Ratification: An Analysis of States’ Entry of Reservations Upon Treaty Ratification
(with Shaina Western)
Political elites often ratify human rights treaties, even when their policies do not align with those treaties’ obligations. We argue that this can be explained by the fact that political elites anticipate the potential challenges these treaties could raise vis-à-vis their domestic policies and enter different types of reservations when they ratify to head them off. The type of reservations they use varies depending on the challenges ratification raises for them - challenges which differ for elites in different regimes and in states with different legal systems. Using an original dataset of human rights treaties registered with the United Nations and employing an event history analysis, we show that the particular challenges treaties present for political elites in these different types of states help to explain variation in how they use reservations when they ratify human rights treaties.
(with Katharine Floros)
Why do so many civil war peace negotiations end in failure? We argue that peace agreements are a function of parties’ bargaining power - the most important source of which is the relative value of parties’ best alternative to agreement (BATNA). One of the goals of parties’ negotiating strategies is therefore to improve the relative value of their own alternative to agreement by worsening that of their opponent. In a civil war context, this alternative to agreement is defined by the continuation of the war. Thus, if one of the two parties believe that continuing to fight can worsen the relative position of the other party, they are likely to reject a peace deal and continue to fight. Rejection of peace agreements and the continuation of civil war can thus be explained as an attempt by one side to win a better distribution of the benefits in the next round of negotiations through changes in the parties’ relative bargaining power expected to occur during the intervening period while war continues. To test our argument, we introduce a new dataset of civil war negotiations that captures the process of negotiations more completely than previous models. Among other key factors, these data code when negotiations are proposed, at what point failed negotiations break down, and whether signed agreements are successful in ending the fighting.
Issue Linkage, Bargaining Power, and Concessions in Trade Negotiations
To understand international negotiations it is important to understand when and why states are likely to give and receive concessions. Understanding this concession-offering process allows us to understand why the outcome of the negotiation looks the way it does – i.e., whose interests are represented in the outcome, and why. I argue that two factors affect when states are likely to win concessions and on what issues those concessions are likely to be received: (1) the degree to which states value the overall set of issues on the table differently, and (2) their bargaining power on each of those individual issues. When the issues being negotiated are more differently valued by the bargaining states, a trade of concessions is more likely to occur. Each side is therefore more likely to receive concessions when the issues on the table are more differently valued. But on what issues are they likely to win those concessions? Counterintuitively, I argue that states are likely to win concessions on precisely the issues on which they most need an agreement, and thus have the least bargaining power. It is therefore the interaction of having more differently-valued issues on the bargaining agenda and less bargaining power that leads a state to win concessions on a particular issue at stake in a negotiation. I test this argument by examining an original dataset of states’ bargaining power and concessions received in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The results show that states are likely to win concessions on an issue when the full set of issues on the table are more differently valued and it has little bargaining power on that particular issue – results that have important implications for our understanding of power and outcomes in international negotiations.
Let’s Talk About Trade: The Politicization and Framing of International Trade Policy
(with Timothy Taylor)
When, why, and how will political elites focus on issues related to international trade in national elections? We argue that political elites are more likely to discuss international trade, in general, when the economic size of the trade agreements that define their state’s trade policies are greater, and they are more likely to frame those discussions of trade in ways that suit their own political interests when those agreements are more complex. We test this argument with cross-country data, focusing on characteristics of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) agreements a state has joined and all preferential trade agreements (PTAs) to which a state is a party. Our empirical results show that the characteristics of a state’s trade policies do likely influence the discussions of international trade put forth by political elites in their party election platforms in important ways.
Reserved Ratification: An Analysis of States’ Entry of Reservations Upon Treaty Ratification
(with Shaina Western)
Political elites often ratify human rights treaties, even when their policies do not align with those treaties’ obligations. We argue that this can be explained by the fact that political elites anticipate the potential challenges these treaties could raise vis-à-vis their domestic policies and enter different types of reservations when they ratify to head them off. The type of reservations they use varies depending on the challenges ratification raises for them - challenges which differ for elites in different regimes and in states with different legal systems. Using an original dataset of human rights treaties registered with the United Nations and employing an event history analysis, we show that the particular challenges treaties present for political elites in these different types of states help to explain variation in how they use reservations when they ratify human rights treaties.