Published Articles
To Link or Not to Link? Agenda Change in International Bargaining. 2016.
British Journal of Political Science 46(2): 371-393. [Replication Files]
The agenda is a key feature of international bargaining. It shapes the strategies states adopt and the substantive nature of the outcomes that result. It is also a dynamic feature of the process, as states add and subtract issues in order to shift the bargaining outcome in their favor. This paper analyzes when and why states will use these different types of ``issue linkage’’ strategies. Focusing on the anticipated effects of the current bargaining agenda and the costs a state will face if an agreement succeeds or fails, it highlights the conditions under which states are likely to use issue addition or issue subtraction. It tests these arguments using an original dataset of the bargaining strategies states adopted in recent climate change negotiations. The paper concludes by highlighting the implications the argument has for our understanding of the outcomes that result from international negotiations.
Levels of Linkage: Across-Agreement v. Within-Agreement Explanations of Consensus Formation Among States. 2014.
International Studies Quarterly 58(1): 44-54. (with Shaina Western)
Decisions in international institutions such as the European Union (EU) are often made by consensus, even when it is not required. Tit-for-tat exchanges provide an explanation for this phenomenon, as such exchanges can help to build up support for agreements states might otherwise not have had an incentive to support. Tit-for-tat exchanges are typically analyzed as trades of support across agreements. However, we argue that the priority of negotiators to further their national and bureaucratic interests makes exchanges across micro-level issues within a single proposal for agreement more prevalent than exchanges across agreements. Using both qualitative and quantitative analyses, we show that such within-agreement, rather than cross-agreement, linkages are related to an increased likelihood of consensus across an array of different EU agreements. To understand consensus in international institutions, more broadly, it is therefore necessary to look at the substantive issues at stake within each agreement.
The Effects of Power and Structure on State Bargaining Strategies. 2013.
American Journal of Political Science 57(2): 411-427. [Replication Files]
When and why will states adopt more (or less) cooperative bargaining strategies? Standard answers to this question focus on the role of state power. Other scholars highlight socialization effects. I argue that in most international negotiations, the institutional bargaining structure will mitigate the effects of power and socialization, and drive state bargaining behavior. Factors highlighted by formal models of international bargaining should therefore best explain the variation in the strategies states adopt. I introduce empirical measures of these abstract concepts, and test their effects against those of power and socialization using an original dataset of state bargaining strategies in the European Union (EU). The results show that structural factors best explain variation in the EU states’ bargaining strategies. I conclude by highlighting the conditions under which these effects should explain state bargaining behavior in other international negotiations, and discuss the implications of this argument for the study of international bargaining.
Issue Characteristics, Issue Linkage, and States’ Choice of Bargaining Strategies in the European Union. 2010.
Journal of European Public Policy 17(5): 694-707.
How do the character and distribution of issues (i.e., issue linkage) affect the choice of bargaining strategies in the European Union (EU)? I argue that despite several important steps taken in the current literature, the theoretical and empirical evaluation of the impact of issue characteristics and issue linkage on bargaining strategies in the EU remains an important path for future research. I briefly review this literature and highlight gaps in our current understanding of these effects. I then build on this discussion to develop empirically testable hypotheses for future work in this research programme. After deriving these hypotheses, I highlight several difficulties related to conceptualization, measurement and research design that future research must overcome in order to empirically test these hypotheses in a rigorous and systematic way. I then conclude by arguing that overcoming these difficulties, though challenging, is a worthwhile endeavor in the study of EU bargaining.
The Shadow of the Future and Bargaining Cooperation in the Context of a Three-Phase International
Cooperation Problem. 2009.
Journal of Politics 71(2): 719-732. (with David Bearce and Katharine Floros)
This paper seeks to answer an important question in international cooperation theory: if cooperation requires successful bargaining among states, then what factors bring these states to the negotiation table in the first place? It presents a game-theoretic model of the ‘’prebargaining’’ phase of the international cooperation problem, positing that states are more likely to enter a bargaining phase when the shadow of the future is long. This hypothesis is then tested in statistical models that explore how different shadow of the future indicators affect the probability of negotiations over territorial, river, and maritime claims in the Western Hemisphere.
British Journal of Political Science 46(2): 371-393. [Replication Files]
The agenda is a key feature of international bargaining. It shapes the strategies states adopt and the substantive nature of the outcomes that result. It is also a dynamic feature of the process, as states add and subtract issues in order to shift the bargaining outcome in their favor. This paper analyzes when and why states will use these different types of ``issue linkage’’ strategies. Focusing on the anticipated effects of the current bargaining agenda and the costs a state will face if an agreement succeeds or fails, it highlights the conditions under which states are likely to use issue addition or issue subtraction. It tests these arguments using an original dataset of the bargaining strategies states adopted in recent climate change negotiations. The paper concludes by highlighting the implications the argument has for our understanding of the outcomes that result from international negotiations.
Levels of Linkage: Across-Agreement v. Within-Agreement Explanations of Consensus Formation Among States. 2014.
International Studies Quarterly 58(1): 44-54. (with Shaina Western)
Decisions in international institutions such as the European Union (EU) are often made by consensus, even when it is not required. Tit-for-tat exchanges provide an explanation for this phenomenon, as such exchanges can help to build up support for agreements states might otherwise not have had an incentive to support. Tit-for-tat exchanges are typically analyzed as trades of support across agreements. However, we argue that the priority of negotiators to further their national and bureaucratic interests makes exchanges across micro-level issues within a single proposal for agreement more prevalent than exchanges across agreements. Using both qualitative and quantitative analyses, we show that such within-agreement, rather than cross-agreement, linkages are related to an increased likelihood of consensus across an array of different EU agreements. To understand consensus in international institutions, more broadly, it is therefore necessary to look at the substantive issues at stake within each agreement.
The Effects of Power and Structure on State Bargaining Strategies. 2013.
American Journal of Political Science 57(2): 411-427. [Replication Files]
When and why will states adopt more (or less) cooperative bargaining strategies? Standard answers to this question focus on the role of state power. Other scholars highlight socialization effects. I argue that in most international negotiations, the institutional bargaining structure will mitigate the effects of power and socialization, and drive state bargaining behavior. Factors highlighted by formal models of international bargaining should therefore best explain the variation in the strategies states adopt. I introduce empirical measures of these abstract concepts, and test their effects against those of power and socialization using an original dataset of state bargaining strategies in the European Union (EU). The results show that structural factors best explain variation in the EU states’ bargaining strategies. I conclude by highlighting the conditions under which these effects should explain state bargaining behavior in other international negotiations, and discuss the implications of this argument for the study of international bargaining.
Issue Characteristics, Issue Linkage, and States’ Choice of Bargaining Strategies in the European Union. 2010.
Journal of European Public Policy 17(5): 694-707.
How do the character and distribution of issues (i.e., issue linkage) affect the choice of bargaining strategies in the European Union (EU)? I argue that despite several important steps taken in the current literature, the theoretical and empirical evaluation of the impact of issue characteristics and issue linkage on bargaining strategies in the EU remains an important path for future research. I briefly review this literature and highlight gaps in our current understanding of these effects. I then build on this discussion to develop empirically testable hypotheses for future work in this research programme. After deriving these hypotheses, I highlight several difficulties related to conceptualization, measurement and research design that future research must overcome in order to empirically test these hypotheses in a rigorous and systematic way. I then conclude by arguing that overcoming these difficulties, though challenging, is a worthwhile endeavor in the study of EU bargaining.
The Shadow of the Future and Bargaining Cooperation in the Context of a Three-Phase International
Cooperation Problem. 2009.
Journal of Politics 71(2): 719-732. (with David Bearce and Katharine Floros)
This paper seeks to answer an important question in international cooperation theory: if cooperation requires successful bargaining among states, then what factors bring these states to the negotiation table in the first place? It presents a game-theoretic model of the ‘’prebargaining’’ phase of the international cooperation problem, positing that states are more likely to enter a bargaining phase when the shadow of the future is long. This hypothesis is then tested in statistical models that explore how different shadow of the future indicators affect the probability of negotiations over territorial, river, and maritime claims in the Western Hemisphere.